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THE FLOW OF NARRATIVE IN THE MIND UNMOORED: AN ACCOUNT OF 
NARRATIVE PROCESSING 
 
ABSTRACT 
Verbal narratives provide incomplete information and can be very long. Yet readers 
and hearers often effortlessly fill in the gaps, and make connections across long 
stretches of text, sometimes even finding this immersive. How is this done? In the last 
few decades, event-indexing situation modelling and complementary accounts of 
narrative emotion have suggested answers. But despite this progress, comparisons 
between real life perception and narrative experience might underplay both changes to 
our model of the world in narrative processing , and the role of reader emotions which 
are unrelated to characters. I reframe narrative experience in predictive processing 
and neural networks, capturing continuity between fiction, perception and states like 
dreaming and imagination, through the flexible instantiation of concepts. In this 
frame, narrative experience is more clearly revealed as a creative experience that can 
share some of the phenomenology of dreams.  
 
KEYWORDS 
stories; narrative; situation model; event indexing; emotion; neural network; 
predictive processing; creativity. 
 
Introduction 
The tale of two men who went to look for Old Man Furry.  
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2
And they were strong, both of them, and the one had killed many bears, but the 
other had not hunted bears before, and he was afraid, and untrained. And when 
they found Old Man Furry, he was so angry that he rushed upon them in an 
instant, and they jumped behind a big pine tree (Turi, 1931, p.128). 
 
How might the Sami audience listening to this story have known why the men 
jumped behind a tree? How did they remember, as the story continued, that only one 
was an experienced hunter? And why might they have kept listening? These questions 
can be framed as: how do we infer missing information from a narrative text? how do 
we connect information across the text so as to experience it as coherent? and why 
can stories be immersive, rendering us indifferent to our environments and usual 
trains of thought? 
To answer these questions, I begin with a summary of event-indexed 
processing leading to situation models, currently the dominant account of verbal 
narrative processing. I suggest that despite many strengths, this account of narrative 
processing  is constrained by  by a separation between inferred information and 
emotion.. I suggest a way to redescribe narrative processing using predictive 
processing (PP) in a high dimensional vector space, allowing a holistic ‘single 
computation’ of all aspects of narrative experience (Clark 2016, 296). This approach 
recognises the existence of the situation model (SM) as one level of memory 
representation arising from narrative processing. Skeletal event sequences identified 
by anthropologists or oral narrative, used after the event to retell/adapt stories, for 
example, bear some resemblance as SMs (Bauman 1986, chapter 5; Aarne and 
Thompson, 1928). It is not the only level, but I argue that the aspects of narrative 
processing relating to other levels of representation must be recruited to explain the 
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SM level; that the inferences leading to an SM must draw on the full range of 
narrative experience The article offers a holistic account of narrative processing 
looking at the dynamic interactions of emotion and inference and the ways they depart 
from real world perception. Seen like this, narrative processing can not only simulate 
the world, but imaginatively remodel it.  
Situation models and event indexing 
In the 1960s researchers on narrative often assumed modular models of 
language processing, representing the text’s linguistic form rather than directly 
representing content (Katz & Postal, 1964; Blumenthal, 1967; Sachs, 1967). 
Bransford and colleagues challenged these assumptions in the early 1970s, showing 
how spatial representations are needed to process sentences like this one: “Three 
turtles rested on a floating log and a turtle swam beneath them”. They concluded that 
sentences should not be “viewed as linguistic objects to be remembered” but as  
“information which [people] can use to construct semantic descriptions of situations” 
(Bransford, Barclay & Franks, 1972, p.194).  
These findings were followed in the 1980s by Johnson-Laird’s work (1983) on 
mental models and van Dijk and Kintsch’s (1983) on situation models. Johnson-Laird 
argued that “human beings understand the world by constructing working models of it 
in their minds,”, models which “are simpler than the entities they represent” 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, p.10). Van Dijk and Kintsch proposed a distinction between 
“the text representation proper” and “a model that the reader or hearer constructs 
about the relevant information for the adequate comprehension of the text” (Van Dijk 
& Kintsch 1983, p.337). This combined body of work suggested that verbal narrative 
processing, using spatial representations, enables the creation of SMs (Morrow, 
Greenspan & Bower, 1987). This does not commit SM advocates to the claim that 
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SMs are the only level of memory representation produced by narrative processing, 
although, as Mar & Oatley observe (2008, p.174), SMs can explain memory for text 
narrative at both automatic (Gerrig & O’Brien, 2005; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1998) and 
conscious, intentional levels (Graesser et al, 1994), and support inferences arising not 
just from spatial relationships, but also of characters’ short and long term goals 
(Glenberg et al, 1987; Trabasso & Wiley 2005). 
Narrative text was also increasingly analysed in hierarchically organised 
chunks. In Van Dijk and Kintsch’s “macro structure theory,”, for example, plot exists 
at a macro level and has a rule governed relationship to micro episodes (van Dijk, 
1977; Kintsch, 1977; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). Emerging “story grammar” theories 
also involved hierarchical organisation around characters and their goals (Rumelhart 
1975, 1977; Meyer, 1975; Thorndyke, 1977; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & 
Glenn, 1979).  
These hierarchical organisations of narrative resembled new accounts of event 
perception. Events are bounded, hierarchically nested, segments of time. “Opening a 
door,”, for example, can be one event within the higher order event of “arriving at a 
party” (Newtson, 1973; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). An event boundary is perceived 
when there is simultaneous change across a set of key dimensions (Zacks et al, 2007). 
The “event indexing model” provided an explanation of how narrative processing 
could lead to SMs .(Zwaan, Langston & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, Magliano & 
Graesser, 1995). In what follows, I suggest that replacing this limited number of 
commonsense dimensions with a high dimensional vector space can improve our 
understanding of the relationship between event segmentation, the creation of SMs 
and narrative experience more broadly.  
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5
The existing dimensions of event change indexed by readers are: which 
character is this?; change in characters’ goals; new information about causation; 
change in location; change in the time of events narrated; and change in characters’ 
interactions with objects (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zacks, Speer & Reynolds, 
2009). This is the model is used by most researchers working on narrative processing 
today (for examples, see Zacks, 2015; Chow et al, 2014; Muijselaar, 2015). The 
production of SMs can provide readers and hearers of verbal narrative with a global 
sense of a story, by organising information around the key dimensions (Sanford & 
Emmott 2013, pp.37 – 38). The production of SMs also relates to narrative inferences: 
the situation builds in knowledge of the world, which is not always explicit in the text. 
The process of SM construction has been used to explain immersion in verbal 
narrative through embodied language processing drawing on behavioural and 
neuroimaging work in embodied language processing such as that of Reddy (2010), 
Hauk (2008), Barsalou (2008), Glenburg & Kaschak (2002), Speer et al (2007) and 
others (Zwaan, 1999). These approaches to narrative processing are  compatible with, 
and sometimes supported by, accounts of emotion and empathy in response to film 
and verbal narrative by Tan, Sanford & Emmott and others (Tan 1994; Sanford & 
Emmott, 2013, 44, pp.191 - 232).  
By moving from modular models of verbatim text representation, event 
indexing and situation modelling have revealed shared elements in narrative 
processing across media, including film (Zacks, 2015; Speer, Zacks and Reynolds, 
2007; Magliano, 2012), and a comparative framework for variations in narrative 
processing between individuals (Kurby, 2011; Bohn-Gettler, 2011). They make clear 
predictions, for example that processing at event boundaries in the text will be slower 
(Zacks, Speer & Reynolds, 2000). By recruiting embodied language processing to 
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6
verbal narrative, they share in a broader move towards embodiment in the cognitive 
sciences (Clark, 1997; Clark, 2016, pp. 109-240). 
These gains have been won by recruiting the resources of everyday perception 
(Zacks, 2015). However, the current account of the processing behind SMs may 
neglect the status of verbal narrative as an artefact, a product of human behaviour, 
whose processing may be comparable to cognition of, say, music or handwriting 
(Knoblich et al, 2002; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009). In what follows, I exploit the 
flexible frameworks of PP and neural networks to explore differences between the 
narrative processing that produces SMs, and everyday perception 
I illustrate my account with the case of a child listening to a fairy tale. Fairy 
tales come closer to a universal narrative experience than the texts used in many 
experiments; they are found in diverse cultures and periods, and are accessible to very 
young hearers with a minimum of prior skill in narrative comprehension (Tehrani, 
2003, pp.1-11; Aarne and Thompson, 1928). 
Listening to The Juniper Tree 
The Juniper Tree was collected and edited by the Grimm brothers in the early 
nineteenth century, and has several cognates in other cultures (Grimms 1973, 314-
332; Aarne and Thompson 1928, tale type 720). Very young children, from a wide 
range of cultures, frequently become immersed in stories like this, as the tales’ 
persistence across time and place, and with young audiences, suggests (Tehrani, 2003, 
pp.1-11; Whitehead 1999, pp.104-107). I analyse the opening of The Juniper Tree in 
the light of existing approaches to the processing that leads to SMs and discuss some 
problems this analysis identifies: 
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7
It is a long time ago now, as much as two thousand years maybe, that there was 
a rich man and he had a wife and she was beautiful and good, and they loved 
each other very much but they had no children even though they wanted some 
so much, the wife prayed and prayed for one both day and night, and still they 
did not and they did not get one. In front of their house was a garden and in the 
garden stood a juniper tree. Once, in wintertime, the woman stood under the tree 
and peeled herself an apple, and as she was peeling the apple she cut her finger 
and the blood fell onto the snow. “Ah,” said the woman and sighed a deep sigh, 
and she looked at the blood before her and her heart ached. “If I only had a child 
as red as blood and as white as snow.” And as she said it, it made her feel very 
happy, as if it was really going to happen (Grimms, 1973, pp.314-315). 
 
There are several examples here of the five dimensions of change (time, space, 
causation, motivation and protagonist; Zwaan & Radvansky 1998): longing for a child 
and peeling an apple (goals); and “in winter” or “under the tree” (changes in time and 
location). Situation modelling of verbal narrative involves an embodied approach to 
modelling space, and event-indexing in narrative involves simulating embodied 
experiences of real life environments (Zacks, 2015, 449). These embodied 
experiences can be seen as a source of emotion, either intrinsic to creating the SM 
(Zwaan 2009), or complementary to it (Sanford & Emmott, 2012, pp.191 - 232). The 
potential for embodied responses to the text through actions - peeling an apple, 
cutting a finger, looking at blood on snow – can help, then, to explain immersion if it 
occurs.  
But here also lies a problem. If an embodied response to a text about cutting a 
finger and bleeding generates emotion, the emotion ought to be negative, even 
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8
distressing, particularly for child hearers. The character’s happiness might then be 
experienced as incoherent. Yet the success of this tale, particularly with children, 
included repeatedly in editions of Grimms’ tales over 200 years, suggests that it is 
not. 
Generic experience of fairy tales might help hearers to bridge the gap between 
real life experience and narrative. Genre knowledge could certainly prepare the child 
hearer for departures from real world experience, such as minimally counterintuitive 
concepts, like the talking bird who appears later (Norenzayan 2006; Thompson 1955-
1958). But generic knowledge cannot filter “happiness” from the range of relevant 
potential responses to injuring one’s finger; a generic example like Sleeping Beauty 
could even make this harder (Kibbe et al, 2017).  
An alternative solution to explain how processing produces the relevant 
information for an SM might be to distinguish reader emotion from the emotion in 
response to character alone. Moves in this direction have been made by Tan (1994) 
and Sanford & Emmott (2013). Tan attributes to readers/viewers not, or not just, the 
simulated emotions of characters, but the emotions of an impotent witness of the 
characters, and argues that these emotions enable, rather than just arising from, 
predictive inferences (Tan 1994, p.184). Sanford and Emmott suggest that “scenario 
mapping” and embodied responses allow the emotions of characters to be “built into” 
readers’ “mental representations”. These lead to reader emotions, modulated by 
approval, liking or closeness to the characters into macro narrative structures of 
curiosity, surprise and suspense, which can generate arousal jags and boosts (pp.196, 
207; drawing on Berlyne 1960, 1971; Brewer and Lichtenstein, 1982; Sternberg 1978, 
2003).  
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9
On their own, however, these accounts cannot solve the problem with The 
Juniper Tree. Children are frequently impotent witnesses of scenes involving adults, 
and it is not clear that in this case the child’s response to seeing an adult woman cut 
her finger would enable her to predict the woman’s happiness. This passage may 
create distance rather than Sanford and Emmott’s closeness – the characters exist in 
an unspecified place and a distant and unspecified time. They have morally attractive 
characteristics – they love one another, they would love a child – but they perform no 
actions in this passage which are open to moral evaluation either way. It would be 
hard to say that a four-year-old child has enough here to generate liking, dislike or 
(dis)approval. This would be hard to settle without empirical investigation, but it is at 
least questionable that emotions arising from closeness, approval and liking, in turn 
leading to hopes and fears, and from there to arousal jags and boosts, can explain why 
very young children can are not puzzled by the woman’s response to a cut finger.  
A holistic account of the hearer’s emotional responses to narrative, however, 
can build on Tan’s alertness to the role of reader/hearer impotence in narrative 
experience, and of the distinction between reader emotion and character emotion. In 
perception, we act on the environment to deepen our understanding of it, if only 
through eye saccades (Grimes, 1996; Smith and Henderson, 2008; Henderson, 2003). 
In narrative experience, however, we are unmoored from our immediate environment; 
the hearer of a narrative cannot act on the stimulus to derive greater sensual 
information about the scene depicted. Both perception and narrative may engage the 
same machinery of predicting incoming signals, as I discuss below (Clark 2016; 
Gerrans 2014). But the concepts instantiated by language cannot always be 
interrogated in the same sensory depth as those arising from perception and action 
embedded in an environment. Instead, they may be experienced in relationship to one 
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10
another, isolated from a shared environment. Even the eye saccades crucial to film 
comprehension can be highly determined by lighting, camera angle, montage etc, and 
the film is not fully available for ecological interrogation through the viewer’s bodily 
location and action (Cutting et al 2011; Hasson et al 2008; Loschky et al 2015; 
Gibson 1979).  
In the first part of the passage from The Juniper Tree, the hearer encounters 
the concepts of a rich man, a good and beautiful wife, the absence of a child, longing 
for a child and praying for a child. The hearer’s passivity, her inability to act on the 
stimulus, means that none of this information can be further probed. The man and the 
wife may give rise to embodied neural effects in relevant sensory and motor areas, but 
these are not instantiated in relation to the child’s perceiving body. Encountering a 
“rich man” face to face, for example, would instantiate a power relationship with a 
child, with embodied consequences (Fiske et al, 2016). Encountering the concept 
through language, however, potentially neutralises such effects and frees the set of 
concepts to interact in novel ways. The “feature tuning” of mental images in response 
to nouns (such as “man” and “wife”) can vary considerably with verbal context 
(Mitchell & Cusack, 2016, pp. 4 – 7). “Man” and “wife”, dis-embedded from a rich 
scene, might mutually influence each other’s instantiations. “Rich” in conjunction 
with “beautiful” might give prominence to the beautiful belongings that wealth can 
buy, rather than, say, the cruel behaviour that wealth can sometimes enable.  
The interactions of this small set of concepts then (“man”, “wife”, “rich”, 
“beautiful”), when experienced passively (in the sense that the body cannot glean 
additional sensory information), in isolation from an environment, and unmoored 
from a perceiving body, may subtly modify the hearer’s statistical model of the 
world’s hierarchy of proximal and distal causes and effects (Clark, 2016; Kirchhoff 
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11
2018). For example, the conjunction of “good”, “rich”, “loving” and “beautiful” with 
“lack” and “longing” may point to a rightly ordered world that has somehow gone 
wrong; the blessed can also be unblessed. Similarly, the imagery of blood on snow 
can be separated from the embodied experience of the cut, so that the blood and snow 
-  again, pushed together through isolation from a perceiving body in a richer 
environment -  can be instantiated through contrasts of colour, temperature and 
texture. As their other features drop out, the aesthetic effect of this combination may 
dominate the potential for distress in a child’s simulation of cutting herself and 
watching herself bleed, recalling Miall and Kuiken’s distinction between “narrative 
emotions” (relating to characters) and “aesthetic emotions” (Miall & Kuiken, 1994, 
1999). The isolation, and then conjunction, of juniper tree, snow, blood, apple, 
aesthetic thrill, and a sudden transition from longing to joy then become causally 
implicated in the subsequent conception of a child.  
This analysis shows the kind of thing that could happen, rather than what must 
happen, but it is enough to raise a doubt that the existing account of event 
segmentation, leading to SMs, using a fixed set of commonsense dimensions, 
alongside  theories of emotional response to characters, can explain this and similar 
narrative inferences which are needed for the SM. In the next section I explore the 
mechanisms by which this hearer might be immersed in narrative through the 
unfolding of a subtly unfamiliar trajectory; a succession of points in a multi-
dimensional space.  
Stratified versus holistic organisation of narrative information 
 Zwaan and Radvansky predict that there may turn out to be more than five 
narrative dimensions involved in the production of SMs (p.167; see Rapp, 2001 for a 
proposed addition). But there is currently no suggestion that the number extends 
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12
beyond common sense concepts such as “location” or “goal”. If “Bill is very tall” 
turns out to be irrelevant to subsequent situations, it is “relegated” and excluded from 
“subsequent situation models”.  If the reader later finds that “Bill could see over 
everyone’s head”, the information can be retrieved and “stored directly with the token 
in the model” (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998, pp.11, 17, 19 - 20).  
 Zwaan and Radvansky are not proposing, then, a division of information into 
“modelled” and “discarded”. But their account does imply that incoming information 
can and should be identified as having greater or lesser importance for the model. If 
all the incoming information could immediately be incorporated in the model without 
compromising it, there would be no need to monitor the dimensions. The power of an 
SM is not just, as Zwaan and Radvansky correctly point out (pp.162-163), that it is 
more efficient than storing representations of verbatim text, but that it is more 
efficient than treating all of the information provided by verbatim text as equally 
important. While other levels of narrative memory and representation may operate 
outside an informational hierarchy of this kind, it would seem to be essential for event 
segmentation and the formation of SMs. 
 I suggest, however, that in the case of The Juniper Tree, dividing the textual 
information in this way can only be done by sacrificing, among other things, the 
contribution of emotion to narrative inference and coherence. Look again at the 
quotation above, from, “In front of their house…”. To update her SM as she hears this 
passage, the child hearer must identify information relevant to goals and causes, two 
of Zwaan’s and Radvansky’s dimensions; that the woman sighed, and that her heart 
ached, not because her finger was sore or her apple spoiled, but because the 
experience seemed somehow relevant to her desire to have a child.  
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13
 But the fine detail of the “irrelevant” information, I suggest, is important to 
emotion, and the role of emotion in processing. In combination, these elements 
configure an emotional experience which has no counterpart in the child’s real life 
experiences of apples and knives, an experience which reveals that the woman’s 
longing will be fulfilled because, in mysterious ways, nature wills it so.  
 We can illustrate this point in a different way by reverse engineering a 
segment of Zwaan and Radvanksy’s illustration of the processing behind SMs - “Peter 
took the elevator to the fifth floor. He went to talk to his professor”: 
 
…When reading th  first sentence, the reader creates a situation model 
involving a token that represents a male individual named Peter who rides an 
elevator for as yet unknown reasons. We assume that the reader infers that Peter 
is in a building and that the event took place before the moment of utterance of 
the sentence….This [second] sentence is integrated with the first one on several 
dimensions. First, the pronoun is a cue to the comprehender to look 
backward…in the integrated model for an appropriate referent. This referent is 
found in Peter, who is the only available referent and shares the feature “male”. 
Second, a goal is constructed (“went to” suggests intentionality…). Third, the 
absence of a shift in tense or any other explicit temporal marker indicates that 
we are still in the same temporal interval... Fourth, the absence of a spatial 
marker indicates we are still in the same spatial region…. Fifth, a second token 
is created representing the professor. The reader probably also infers that Peter 
is a student. This is the content of the current model at Time t2.  
 
This can be represented schematically :  
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t1 Create PETER
TOKEN (male) 
t1 Create ELEVATOR IN BUILDING IN PAST
SPATIO-TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK 
t1 Combine PETER
TOKEN (male) 
in ELEVATOR IN BUILDING IN PAST
SPATIO-TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK 
t2 Create PROFESSOR
TOKEN (male) 
t2 Modify PETER
TOKEN (male) 
with GOAL
VISIT PROFESSOR
 and with 
(student) 
t2 Incorporate t2 elements with t1 elements.  
 
If we use this set of instructions to generate a new text, one possibility of many is this: 
“Peter rode in the elevator up, up, up. His professor waited as Peter came nearer and 
nearer.” This text is different from the initial one in many ways, from the professor 
waiting, to the absence of “the fifth floor”. But it is as compatible with the situation 
model above as the original. The reader’s emotion, however, is likely to be different. 
The stylistic emphasis on the changing relative distance between Peter and the 
professor may create an element of anxious anticipation. Emotion arising from verbal 
form may underpin the inference of information, rather than the reverse (compare 
Barrett and Bar, 2009). The verbal form suggests that either Peter or the Professor has 
something to fear from the encounter. Peter’s goal may not be related to their roles of 
student and professor; Peter may not be a student at all if his relationship to the 
professor may be that of, say, victim or aggressor. The repetitions of “up” and 
“nearer” do not provide new information on the SM’s dimensions. Yet their emotional 
impact on the reader is important for identifying precisely the information – such as 
characters’ goals - which an SM is intended to capture. While the SM itself need not 
capture reader emotion, the processing leading up to it must if the information in the 
SM is to be correct (for earlier work pointing in this direction, see McNamara & 
Magliano, 2009 and Graesser, Olde & Klettke 2002).  
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15
  Suppose the repetitions in “up and up” and “nearer and nearer” cause fear, 
telling the reader that either Peter or the professor has a sinister goal. Could this 
simply mean a different “goal” node than the model of the first passage? The spatio-
temporal information still models Peter in an elevator and the professor in a room, just 
as in the first case.  
But if the repetitions of “up” and “nearer” simply switch the goal node from 
“visit professor, probably in relation to studies” to “go to professor’s room, not clear 
why, but this may involve danger either to Peter or the professor”, does this bundle of 
information, a bundle which must be expanded if it is to include all the implications 
of fear, deserve the name of “goal node”? Recall that the strength of SMs is saving the 
hearer or reader from remembering not only all the verbatim text, but all of the 
information conveyed by that text. If the model is to incorporate all the implicit 
information generated by emotion, it will be burdened with even more information 
than that of the verbatim text. If emotion is treated as information encoded in the text, 
then it cannot be incorporated in an SM. Yet, as we have seen, emotion may be 
crucial to help a child make correct inferences about texts like The Juniper Tree. An 
improved account of narrative processing, then, will be holistic in its approach to 
information, and distinguish more clearly between the experiential aspects of 
perceiving something, and those of hearing or reading about it.  
A first step is to rethink the processing behind SMs as structured not by five or 
six common sense dimensions, but by dimensions too many to enumerate, resisting 
commonplace psychological categorisation. A neural network model of processing in 
this high dimensional vector space (explained below) can capture recurring 
experiences in processing a given text, including the effects of verbal patterning, 
emotion and the perception of language as agent guided behaviour. Characterising 
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those recurrent, downward projections as predictive can also suggest a convincing 
story about immersion in a flow of inner states, and explain overlaps in 
phenomenology between dreaming and narrative immersion. 
High dimensional vector spaces and verbal narrative 
 Think of a word as a sequence of sounds, where each sound has the potential 
to differentially activate every cell in an array. Each phoneme will come to be 
associated with a different pattern, or vector, of activation. The array activates 
another, higher, array through a set of connecting links or synapses, which in turn 
activates the next, and so on. The varying strengths or weights of these connections 
between layers have been determined by past experience, and form matrices which 
transform the vectors and allow recognition of groups of sounds, then words, phrases, 
clauses, sentences and so on (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Churchland, 2012; 
Jordan, 1986).  
As well as these upward connections, each array has downward connections to 
the one below. This means that the effect of one input on the system can affect the 
way the next input is received, so that frequently repeated sequences of inputs are 
more easily recognised than others (Churchland, 2012, pp.165-170). At a certain level 
or levels, the points in the vector space initially activated by speech sounds move into 
spaces generated by a much wider range of stimuli associated with those speech 
sounds. On hearing the sounds for the word “apple”, for example, a processing 
journey begins which, depending on the context, may end in an area of vector space 
overlapping, though not identical with, that activated by seeing a real apple (Reddy et 
al, 2010).  
Now let us revisit The Juniper Tree. How does the hearer make the link 
between the interactions of a cluster of concepts (juniper, apple, blood, snow), the 
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emotion associated with those interactions, and a character’s conception of a longed 
for child? At first blush, adopting a vector space framework takes us no further 
forward with this problem. The world model of interacting causes built into this 
framework is embedded in the matrices of connection weights, and altering these 
weights is a slow and cumulative process, a matter of weeks or years, not the seconds 
or fractions of seconds involved in responding to a section of a story. How can 
hearing a brief text, or fragment of text, temporarily modify these weights to 
accommodate a different analysis, one in which cut fingers activate representations 
involving beauty and yearning rather than pain and distress, for example? 
One possibility is that instead of modifying the matrices of weights, the 
recurrent, downward connections can modify the stream of inputs. In the case of The 
Juniper Tree, all of the effects of the text to date influence the pattern of downward 
connections in ways that affect the upward impact of new inputs. The succession of 
states and their direction of travel form a trajectory through vector space. In what 
follows, I suggest that verbal narratives can stimulate trajectories of this kind that 
depart from normal perceptual experience, while staying within the bounds of a pre-
existing world model. 
Behavioural, neuro-psychological and neuroimaging evidence suggests that 
“concepts are flexible, distributed representations comprised of modality specific 
conceptual features” (Kiefer and Pulvermüller 2012, 805). This flexibility is 
consistent with accounts by Paul Churchland and Margaret Boden characterising the 
reconceptualization of an input in the “hidden” layers of a neural network as a 
creative process. Each cycle of Newton’s meditations on the moon could modify his 
existing concept a little more, until the moon is less like a wheel running on a track 
and more like a ball thrown by a force (Churchland 2012, pp.187-196; Boden 2004). 
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The everyday experience of narrative text may similarly push us through otherwise 
unfamiliar trajectories in vector space. 
Vector spaces and inference  
The extract from The Juniper Tree, typically of fairy tales (Thompson, 1946, 
p.8), provides minimal information about particulars of place or time. The event 
happened “once” and “in winter time” rather than on, say, 4 January 1822. The time, 
then, is indeterminate, as are the unmodified nouns “woman”, “tree”, “apple” and so 
on. Adjectival modification affects the ways in which nouns are processed 
(Westerlund et al, 2015; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2013). Each of the unmodified concrete 
nouns in this case, then, could potentially activate an area of vector space associated 
with a prototypical representation (of women, trees, apples and so on), areas which 
capture averages of similarity and difference across multiple dimensions, thus 
enabling real life recognition of a particular woman, tree or apple by its location 
relative to the average. Coming as they do in a sequence, the downward, recurring 
connections generated by these nouns create a context in which singular entities (the 
particular woman, tree, apple of the story) are reconceptualised as prototypical ones 
(compare the comments on style and prediction in Kuperberg & Jaeger, 2016, p.48). 
The later nouns “blood” and “snow” arrive in, and reinforce, a landscape of 
prototypes. A real life encounter with objects and people that all coincided precisely 
with the average of their type might create a sense of the uncanny, and “seemingly 
invite a supernatural explanation” (Bouvet and Bonnefon, 2015, p. 956).  
A second contextual effect could arise from repeated syntactic patterns. The 
text consists mainly of additive clauses – “and as she was peeling…and the blood 
fell…and she looked…and her heart ached” – with little of the subordination (“she cut 
her finger causing the blood to fall”, “her heart ached because…”) that can point 
Page 19 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cphp E-mail: pp@mechanism.ucsd.edu
Philosophical Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
 
19
directly to causal relationships (Morera et al, 2017). In perception, a repeated 
temporal sequence can have a strong, sometimes misleading, association with 
causality (Churchland, 2012, pp.177-178). However, the recurrent connections 
generated by a repeated syntactic pattern of additive clauses could undo this because 
the hearer is not free to probe causation as she would in a richer environment.  
By contrast, perception of a scene like this in a real world, rich environment 
would be structured by causal relationships. The appearance of the woman would be 
modulated by effects of light and shadow caused by the tree and the snow (Kersten et 
al 1997). Spatial structure has long been understood as important to perceiving causal 
narrative structure (Heider 1944), just as internal scene construction is critical to both 
episodic memory and verbal narrative (Mullally et al 2012). In this case, in the 
absence of a causal structure relating many of the elements in the scene, and in a 
landscape of syntactically weakened causal links, other patterns of similarity and 
difference can interpret the relationships between inputs. The tastes and textures of 
apples, for example, and the texture and temperature of snow could be located in 
adjacent or overlapping areas of vector space, as multisensory integration (Stein et al, 
1988) is released from the constraints imposed by real world stimuli. The pain of a cut 
might be measured against the colour and temperature of blood. In a real world scene 
these modality specific overlaps may be unimportant, but here, in a sparser, less 
defined scene, they take on new power. The synaesthetic effects of this process 
would, moreover, have an aesthetic reward (Ward et al, 2008).  
Now let us imagine that the hearer has had many disappointed hopes, but has 
also experienced a powerful hope turning into a belief. The move from hope to belief, 
then, is a possible sequence for her, but not a necessary one. In a context coloured by 
the uncanny and by aesthetic reward, a context in which normal causal relations have 
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been muted, this sequence (of hope turning to belief) may become the most likely 
path for upcoming activation (compare Clark, 2016, pp.231 – 237). The hearer can 
hypothesise that the woman sighs because of longing, not physical pain, without 
modifying her world model’s matrix of weights.  
A vector space account of narrative coherence 
 In 1990, the cognitive scientist Jeffrey Elman discussed the problems of 
representing time in parallel, distributed, connectionist models of cognition, similar to 
the neural networks outlined above. Until then, Elman explained, a common approach 
to the parallel processing of sequentially structured inputs, like language, had been to 
treat time as “an additional dimension of the input” by giving it an explicit “spatial 
representation”. The first item in a verbal sequence could be represented in the first 
space in a vector, and so on. Elman argued that this approach runs into intractable 
problems (which I do not discuss here; Elman, 1990). Time is an explicit dimension 
of the input to SMs in existing accounts: a complete SM, ‘stored in long-term memory 
after all the textual input has been processed’ will consist of ‘the situations at Times t1 
through tx’, allowing comprehenders to ‘ruminate over a story’ later (Zwaan & 
Radvansky 1998, 166). While not described as a spatial representation in the form of 
a numerical matrix, this is an approach which makes time an explicit dimension in 
both processing (one of the five associated with SMs) and output (the SM itself).  
 Instead of treating time as a dimension of the input, Elman suggested instead 
an implicit representation of time in which a layer of “context” cells is added to the 
layers of “hidden” cells. At time t:  
 
Both the input units and context units activate the hidden units; the hidden 
 units then feed forward to activate the output units. The hidden units also feed  
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back to activate the context units. (Elman 1990, p.182).  
 
The context units modify future inputs by responding to previous inputs. In this way, 
time can be represented through its cumulative effects “on processing and not as an 
additional dimension of the input”.  
 A “spatial metaphor for time” of the kind identified by Elman as problematic 
is implied by the SM’s linear structure from t1 to tx, which ensures coherence, letting 
the reader ‘know when the described events took place both relative to each other and 
relative to the time at which they were narrated’  (Elman, 1990, p.181; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998, p.181).  But are such representations of time always essential to the 
processing that enables SMs? If I am asked to write a reference, I might try to recall 
specific instances of the candidate’s past behaviour. However, if I predict what my 
friend will order at a restaurant, I need not bring to mind all or any of the past 
episodes underwriting that prediction, even if I could. To test narrative 
comprehension, researchers need to resolve the experience of verbal narrative into 
actions after the event, such as answering questions about a story accurately, or 
retelling it (Ennemoser 2007, p. 354; Strong 1998). One way to describe this is the 
ability to interrogate the SM which arose from processing the narrative.  
But there is another way to think about, and potentially even measure, verbal 
narrative comprehension: the success of a cognitive system in continually moving 
towards stasis in response to an incoming flow of text (Spivey, 2007, p.36 and 
elsewhere). A child hearer could experience this move to stasis yet still perhaps be 
unable, if asked, to accurately reconstruct a timeline of the story or answer questions 
accurately. Even scrub jays can “remember” sequences of their own actions without, 
presumably, being able to represent those sequences to themselves or to others 
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(Clayton and Dickinson 1998, 1999; Suddendorf and Busby, 2003). As Elman points 
out, “The representation of time – and memory – is highly task-dependent”. A 
potentially explicit spatial representation of time may be essential to the task of 
reproducing a story. But it is not necessarily essential to experiencing the flow of 
verbal narrative as coherent.  
The Juniper Tree continues with the woman’s pregnancy, her death from 
happiness on giving birth, and her husband’s remarriage: 
 
By the second wife he had a daughter, but the child of his first wife was a little 
son as red as blood and as white as snow. Now when the woman looked at her 
daughter she loved her so, but looking at the little boy cut her to the heart.  
 
Not long after, the stepmother kills the boy and hides the evidence by cooking the 
body parts in a stew. The text never refers to her as “the stepmother” but as “the 
woman” or, when addressed by the boy himself, “mother”: “Mother,” said the little 
boy, “how strange and wild you look!”. To avoid confusion with the real mother, and 
experience the story as coherent, the child hearer must remember that the real mother 
died and was replaced by a wicked stepmother. One solution is to tag the mother’s 
death and the stepmother’s arrival as tx and tx+1, in, ready for incorporation in an SM 
by situating them on a timeline. But the child’s experience of the text as coherent can 
be explained without this explicit representation of time: 
 
And so the mother took the little boy and hacked him in pieces and put the 
pieces in the pot and stewed him in the sour broth. But Ann Marie stood by and 
cried and cried and the tears fell in the pot so that it didn’t need any salt. 
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When the father came home he sat down to supper and said, “And where is my 
son?” And so the mother brought a big dish of black stew and Ann Marie cried 
and couldn’t stop crying.  
 
I argued above that the real mother could be generated in areas of vector space which 
involved the uncanny and the aesthetic effects of synaesthesia. The stepmother, on the 
other hand, is developed through “taking” and “hacking”, and the objects surrounding 
her are “the pot” and “the sour broth”, reinforced soon after as “a big dish” and “black 
stew”. The difference in the areas of vector space activated in each case mean that 
neither a timeline of death and remarriage, nor a consistent verbal distinction between 
“mother” and “stepmother”, are needed for the child hearer to experience the text as 
coherent. Indeed, at this point in the story she need not even explicitly remember that 
there ever was a good mother. After all, many stories, including oral epic and 
medieval romance, are experienced as coherent even when found, after performance, 
to be incoherent and flawed by “continuity errors” (Griffith, 2012).  
A predictive, vector space account of narrative immersion 
 There is growing evidence that language comprehension is predictive at every 
level, from phonemes and words to discourse. Probabilistic processing, for example, 
can pre-activate words in comprehension (Delong et al, 2005). Grammatical 
inflections can be anticipated through semantic integration, and word meanings can 
be predicted on the basis of discourse context (Wicha et al, 2004; Van Berkum et al, 
2005; Otten and Van Berkum, 2008). These findings are drawn from different 
languages, multiple linguistic levels and using varied methodologies (Kamide et al, 
2003a; Kamide et al, 2003b; Knoeferle et al, 2005).  
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We can, then, characterise the downward connections discussed above as 
predictions about the incoming verbal signal (Clark, 2016, 285-286). In a PP 
framework, downward hypotheses are met by upward prediction error. Patterns of 
prediction error simultaneously modify the next wave of downward hypotheses and 
allocate precision, or increased weight, to the most reliable sources of error for the 
task at hand. Action is integral to this cycle of hypotheses, prediction error and 
precision allocation, through, for example, eye saccades.  
One outcome of a move to PP, or hypothesising controlled by prediction error 
(Clark, 2016), is a new account of relationships between cognitive states such as 
dreaming, hallucination, delusion and imagination (Gerrans, 2014, p. 1; Kirchhoff, 
2018; Seth, 2014, p.101). In what follows I characterise hearing or reading a narrative 
as a cognitive state in which prediction error is limited to the incoming verbal stream, 
so that the hearer or reader, to successfully predict the incoming signal, must predict 
her own inner states, sequestering her sensorimotor responses from the machinery of 
the world around her. 
Actions to probe the environment can help the hearer to predict the stream of 
words in The Juniper Tree only to a limited extent. Perhaps the storyteller has a lisp, 
and she must compensate for this when predicting phonemes, or perhaps he uses 
particular gestures in their shared space, and her predictive system might direct 
saccades to his face and body (Lwin, 2010). But greater attention to arm movements 
and sound articulation will not help her predict the states of higher levels in her own 
system, such as the combined effects of synaesthesia and the uncanny identified 
above. For these, her best – indeed her only – source of information is the trajectory 
of inner states arising from the experience of the text itself. It is these higher- level 
inner states which must be explored and probed through the mechanism of precision 
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weighting. The hearer’s own states become her environment as far as predicting the 
text goes. In this light, the potential for immersion is not surprising. 
Seen like this, narrative experience in one respect resembles dreaming. Both 
experiences engage the mind in actively predicting an incoming stream of data, but 
without the body being able to act on its environment to direct that stream. Hobson 
and Friston characterise sleep as a state “in which internal predictions are sequestered 
from sensory constraints” (Hobson and Friston, 2012, p.92).  
 Embodied responses to language suggest that the reader or hearer of narrative 
may similarly find her sensorimotor system engaged while sequestered from any 
stimulus but the verbal stream, and inhibited from acting on any stimulus but the 
verbal stream (for example by re-reading a sentence, or asking a reader to pause). 
Narrative comprehension then, might be characterised as simultaneously active, in the 
sense that the system has considerable work to do on internal states as it seeks to 
optimise prediction and achieve stasis, and passive, in that the body has only very 
limited opportunities to act on its environment in pursuit of that stasis, and must 
develop new trajectories from existing resources to account for the succession of 
internal states.  
 The analogy between narrative immersion and dreaming should not be 
overdone. Narrative stimuli are artefacts, dreams are not. Readers can re-read, but 
dreamers cannot pause and repeat a section of a stimulus. Narrative can engage and 
require conscious effort at problem solving in way that dreams cannot. And readers 
can stop at will. But shared constraints in the two conditions may explain at least 
some of the dream-like phenomenology of narrative immersion. 
 This account of immersion does not require hearers and readers to feel 
emotions for characters, as some existing theories of transportation do (Gerrig, 1993; 
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Green & Brock, 2002). Fairy stories like The Juniper Tree can be immersive, but do 
not necessarily encourage direct emotional responses to characters. Stock characters 
are central, not peripheral, to this and other oral genres (Propp, 2010; Lord, 2000). 
The same could be said of immersive responses to a range of other non-realist (in 
Barthes’ sense of ‘the reality effect’; 1986) fictions, which some readers/hearers find 
immersive, from Homer to Virginia Woolf.  
 The sketch above does not assume immersion always happens, just as existing 
models do not assume that comprehension always happens. Some stories, or some 
readers, might reveal an easy to predict causal structure involving little emotion, so 
that attention wanders. With others, prediction might be too hard to permit flow, at 
least on a first reading (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). But a predictive account can explain 
the possibility of later immersion through practice and re-reading, as readers grow 
more expert at predicting a text, like Joyce’s Ulysses (a tough first read for many, an 
immersive re-read for some), an author or a genre (Kibbe et al, 2017).  
Problems 
  There are potential problems in at least three areas: the cognitive framework; 
a role for conscious reflection; and empirical testing. 
 I have drawn on Clark’s (2016) account of Bayesian predictive processing 
implemented in a neural network. Clark himself has identified some problems with 
both elements (pp.297-300). Alternative approaches to probabilistic inference have 
been explored in both neural simulations and in studies of the biological brain (Egner 
& Summerfield, 2013). Neural networks may not be the best, or even a possible, 
architecture for a generative, probabilistic approach to cognition (Hinton, 2006; 
Wacongne et al, 2012).  
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 Another concern is the role of higher domain areas, such as conscious verbal 
reasoning, in probabilistic, generative predictive processing (pp.299-300). I have 
argued that implicit, rather than explicit, representations of time may be enough to 
support at least some narrative processing. But conscious reflection on narrative 
experience may be needed to retell, interpret and experience stories as meaningful and 
instructive. Reducing the role of reflection may mean missing some of the point of 
narrative in the first place (Mulhall, 2007; Malinowski, 1926).  
 A third issue concerns making and testing predictions. Spivey and others have 
pioneered methods to measure language processing in real time (Spivey, 2007, pp.74-
77). In combination with real time measures of affect, these could test predictions 
about how, for example, affect guides hearers towards inferences in narrative 
processing. Rapid advances in the verbal classification of images by neural networks 
suggest that upending these networks to produce images from text (as readers do) may 
reveal surprising implicit causal frameworks (Mordvintsev, 2015).  
Conclusion 
 Describing narrative experience in a PP, neural network framework reveals 
that the range of benefits we reap from stories may be both more subtle and more 
widely diffused than we realise. Narrative experience may be a highly creative 
process, reconceiving the world as recognisable, yet with a different causal structure 
to that in which we live and move and have our being.  
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ABSTRACT 
Verbal narratives provide incomplete information and can be very long. Yet readers 
and hearers often effortlessly fill in the gaps, and make connections across long 
stretches of text, sometimes even finding this immersive. How is this done? In the last 
few decades, event-indexing situation modelling and complementary accounts of 
narrative emotion have suggested answers. DBut despite this progress, comparisons 
between real life perception and narrative experience might underplay they way 
narrative processing modifies our world model, and the role of those emotions that do 
not relate to charactersboth changes to our model of the world in narrative processing, 
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2
and the role of reader emotions which are unrelated to characters. I reframe narrative 
experience in predictive processing and neural networks, capturing continuity 
between fiction, perception and states like dreaming and imagination, enabled 
bythrough the flexible instantiation of concepts. In this framework, narrative 
experience is more clearly revealed as a creative experience that can share some of 
the phenomenology of dreams.  
 
KEYWORDS 
stories; narrative; situation model; event indexing; emotion; neural network; 
predictive processing; creativity. 
 
Introduction 
The tale of two men who went to look for Old Man Furry.  
And they were strong, both of them, and the one had killed many bears, but the 
other had not hunted bears before, and he was afraid, and untrained. And when 
they found Old Man Furry, he was so angry that he rushed upon them in an 
instant, and they jumped behind a big pine tree (Turi, 1931, p.128). 
 
How might the Sami audience listening to this story have known why the men 
jumped behind a tree? How did they remember, as the story continued, that only one 
was an experienced hunter? And why might they have kept listening? These questions 
can be framed as: how do we infer missing information from a narrative text? how do 
we connect information across the text so as to experience it as coherent? and why 
can stories be immersive, rendering us indifferent to our environments and usual 
trains of thought? 
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3
To answer these questions, I begin with a summary of event-indexed 
processing leading to situation models, currently the dominant account of verbal 
narrative processing. I suggest that despite many strengths, this account of narrative 
processing is constrained by a separation between inferred information and emotion. I 
suggest a way to redescribe narrative processing using predictive processing (PP) in a 
high dimensional vector space, allowing a holistic ‘single computation’ of all aspects 
of narrative experience (Clark 2016, 296). This approach recognises the existence of 
the situation model (SM) as one level of memory representation arising from narrative 
processing. Skeletal event sequences identified by anthropologists ofr oral narrative, 
used after the event to ret ll/adapt stories, for example, bear some resemblance toas 
SMs (Bauman 1986, chapter 5; Aarne and Thompson, 1928). It is not the only level, 
but I argue that the aspects of narrative processing relating to other levels of 
representation must be recruited to explain the SM level; that the inferences leading to 
an SM must draw on the full range of narrative experience The article offers a holistic 
account of narrative processing looking at the dynamic interactions of emotion and 
inference and the ways they depart from real world perception. Seen like this, 
narrative processing can not only simulate the world, but imaginatively remodel it.  
Situation models and event indexing 
In the 1960s researchers on narrative often assumed modular models of 
language processing, representing the text’s linguistic form rather than directly 
representing content (Katz & Postal, 1964; Blumenthal, 1967; Sachs, 1967). 
Bransford and colleagues challenged these assumptions in the early 1970s, showing 
how spatial representations are needed to process sentences like this one: “Three 
turtles rested on a floating log and a turtle swam beneath them”. They concluded that 
sentences should not be “viewed as linguistic objects to be remembered” but as  
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4
“information which [people] can use to construct semantic descriptions of situations” 
(Bransford, Barclay & Franks, 1972, p.194).  
These findings were followed in the 1980s by Johnson-Laird’s work (1983) on 
mental models and van Dijk and Kintsch’s (1983) on situation models. Johnson-Laird 
argued that “human beings understand the world by constructing working models of it 
in their minds,” models which “are simpler than the entities they represent” (Johnson-
Laird, 1983, p.10). Van Dijk and Kintsch proposed a distinction between “the text 
representation proper” and “a model that the reader or hearer constructs about the 
relevant information for the adequate comprehension of the text” (Van Dijk & 
Kintsch 1983, p.337). This combined body of work suggested that verbal narrative 
processing, using spatial representations, enables the creation of SMs (Morrow, 
Greenspan & Bower, 1987). This does not commit SM advocates to the claim that 
SMs are the only level of memory repr sentation produced by narrative processing, 
although, as Mar & Oatley observe (2008, p.174), SMs can explain memory for text 
narrative at both automatic (Gerrig & O’Brien, 2005; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1998) and 
conscious, intentional levels (Graesser et al, 1994), and support inferences arising not 
just from spatial relationships, but also fromof characters’ short and long term goals 
(Glenberg et al, 1987; Trabasso & Wiley 2005). 
Narrative text was also increasingly analysed in hierarchically organised 
chunks. In Van Dijk and Kintsch’s “macro structure theory,” for example, plot exists 
at a macro level and has a rule governed relationship to micro episodes (van Dijk, 
1977; Kintsch, 1977; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). Emerging “story grammar” theories 
also involved hierarchical organisation around characters and their goals (Rumelhart 
1975, 1977; Meyer, 1975; Thorndyke, 1977; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & 
Glenn, 1979).  
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5
These hierarchical organisations of narrative resembled new accounts of event 
perception. Events are bounded, hierarchically nested, segments of time. “Opening a 
door,” for example, can be one event within the higher order event of “arriving at a 
party” (Newtson, 1973; Zacks & Tversky, 2001). An event boundary is perceived 
when there is simultaneous change across a set of key dimensions (Zacks et al, 2007). 
The “event indexing model” provided an explanation of how narrative processing 
could lead to SMs (Zwaan, Langston & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, Magliano & 
Graesser, 1995). In what follows, I suggest that replacing this limited number of 
commonsense dimensions with a high dimensional vector space can improve our 
understanding of the relationship between event segmentation, the creation of SMs 
and narrative experience more broadly.  
The existing dimensions of event change indexed by readers are: which 
character is this?; change in characters’ goals; new information about causation; 
change in location; change in the time of events narrated; and change in characters’ 
interactions with objects (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998; Zacks, Speer & Reynolds, 
2009). This model is used by most researchers working on narrative processing today 
(for examples, see Zacks, 2015; Chow et al, 2014; Muijselaar, 2015). The production 
of SMs can provide readers and hearers of verbal narrative with a global sense of a 
story, by organising information around the key dimensions (Sanford & Emmott 
2013, pp.37 – 38). The production of SMs also relates to narrative inferences: the 
situation builds in knowledge of the world, which is not always explicit in the text. 
The process of SM construction has been used to explain immersion in verbal 
narrative through embodied language processing drawing on behavioural and 
neuroimaging work in embodied language processing such as that of Reddy (2010), 
Hauk (2008), Barsalou (2008), Glenburg & Kaschak (2002), Speer et al (2007) and 
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6
others (Zwaan, 1999). These approaches to narrative processing are  compatible with, 
and sometimes supported by, accounts of emotion and empathy in response to film 
and verbal narrative by Tan, Sanford & Emmott and others (Tan 1994; Sanford & 
Emmott, 2013, 44, pp.191 - 232).  
By moving from modular models of verbatim text representation, event 
indexing and situation modelling have revealed shared elements in narrative 
processing across media, including film (Zacks, 2015; Speer, Zacks and Reynolds, 
2007; Magliano, 2012), and a comparative framework for variations in narrative 
processing between individuals (Kurby, 2011; Bohn-Gettler, 2011). They make clear 
predictions, for example that processing at event boundaries in the text will be slower 
(Zacks, Speer & Reynolds, 2000). By recruiting embodied language processing to 
verbal narrative, they share in a broader move towards embodiment in the cognitive 
sciences (Clark, 1997; Clark, 2016, pp. 109-240). 
These gains have been won by recruiting the resources of everyday perception 
(Zacks, 2015). However, the current account of the processing behind SMs may 
neglect the status of verbal narrative as an artefact, a product of human behaviour, 
whose processing may be comparable to cognition of, say, music or handwriting 
(Knoblich et al, 2002; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009). In what follows, I exploit the 
flexible frameworks of PP and neural networks to explore differences between the 
narrative processing that produces SMs, and everyday perception. 
I illustrate my account with the case of a child listening to a fairy tale. Fairy 
tales come closer to a universal narrative experience than the texts used in many 
experiments; they are found in diverse cultures and periods, and are accessible to very 
young hearers with a minimum of prior skill in narrative comprehension (Tehrani, 
2003, pp.1-11; Aarne and Thompson, 1928). 
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7
Listening to The Juniper Tree 
The Juniper Tree was collected and edited by the Grimm brothers in the early 
nineteenth century, and has several cognates in other cultures (Grimms 1973, 314-
332; Aarne and Thompson 1928, tale type 720). Very young children, from a wide 
range of cultures, frequently become immersed in stories like this, as the tales’ 
persistence across time and place, and with young audiences, suggests (Tehrani, 2003, 
pp.1-11; Whitehead 1999, pp.104-107). I analyse the opening of The Juniper Tree in 
the light of existing approaches to the processing that leads to SMs and discuss some 
problems this analysis identifies: 
 
It is a long time ago now, as much as two thousand years maybe, that there was 
a rich man and he had a wife and she was beautiful and good, and they loved 
each other very much but they had no children even though they wanted some 
so much, the wife prayed and prayed for one both day and night, and still they 
did not and they did not get one. In front of their house was a garden and in the 
garden stood a juniper tree. Once, in wintertime, the woman stood under the tree 
and peeled herself an apple, and as she was peeling the apple she cut her finger 
and the blood fell onto the snow. “Ah,” said the woman and sighed a deep sigh, 
and she looked at the blood before her and her heart ached. “If I only had a child 
as red as blood and as white as snow.” And as she said it, it made her feel very 
happy, as if it was really going to happen (Grimms, 1973, pp.314-315). 
 
There are several examples here of the five dimensions of change (time, space, 
causation, motivation and protagonist; Zwaan & Radvansky 1998): longing for a child 
and peeling an apple (goals); and “in winter” or “under the tree” (changes in time and 
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8
location). Situation modelling of verbal narrative involves an embodied approach to 
modelling space, and event-indexing in narrative involves simulating embodied 
experiences of real life environments (Zacks, 2015, 449). These embodied 
experiences can be seen as a source of emotion, either intrinsic to creating the SM 
(Zwaan 2009), or complementary to it (Sanford & Emmott, 2012, pp.191 - 232). The 
potential for embodied responses to the text through actions - peeling an apple, 
cutting a finger, looking at blood on snow – can help, then, to explain immersion if it 
occurs.  
But here also lies a problem. If an embodied response to a text about cutting a 
finger and bleeding generates emotion, the emotion ought to be negative, even 
distressing, particularly for child hearers. The character’s happiness might then be 
experienced as incoherent. Yet the success of this tale, particularly with children, 
included repeatedly in editions of Grimms’ tales over 200 years, suggests that it is 
not. 
Generic experience of fairy tales might help hearers to bridge the gap between 
real life experience and narrative. Genre knowledge could certainly prepare the child 
hearer for departures from real world experience, such as minimally counterintuitive 
concepts, like the talking bird who appears later in the tale (Norenzayan 2006; 
Thompson 1955-1958). But generic knowledge cannot filter “happiness” from the 
range of relevant potential responses to injuring one’s finger; a generic example like 
Sleeping Beauty could even make this harder (Kibbe et al, 2017).  
An alternative solution to explain how processing produces the relevant 
information for an SM might be to distinguish reader emotion from the emotion in 
response to character alone. Moves in this direction have been made by Tan (1994) 
and Sanford & Emmott (2013). Tan attributes to readers/viewers not, or not just, the 
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9
simulated emotions of characters, but the emotions of an impotent witness of the 
characters, and argues that these emotions enable, rather than just arising from, 
predictive inferences (Tan 1994, p.184). Sanford and Emmott suggest that “scenario 
mapping” and embodied responses allow the emotions of characters to be “built into” 
readers’ “mental representations”. These lead to reader emotions, modulated by 
approval, liking or closeness to the characters into macro narrative structures of 
curiosity, surprise and suspense, which can generate arousal jags and boosts (pp.196, 
207; drawing on Berlyne 1960, 1971; Brewer and Lichtenstein, 1982; Sternberg 1978, 
2003).  
On their own, however, these accounts cannot solve the problem with The 
Juniper Tree. Children are frequently impotent witnesses of scenes involving adults, 
and it is not clear that in this case the child’s response to seeing an adult woman cut 
her finger would enable her to predict the woman’s happiness. This passage may 
create distance rather than Sanford and Emmott’s closeness – the characters exist in 
an unspecified place and a distant and unspecified time. They have morally attractive 
characteristics – they love one another, they would love a child – but they perform no 
actions in this passage thatwhich are open to moral evaluation either way. It would be 
hard to say that a four-year-old child has enough here to generate liking, dislike or 
(dis)approval. This would be hard to settle without empirical investigation, but it is at 
least questionable that emotions arising from closeness, approval and liking, in turn 
leading to hopes and fears, and from there to arousal jags and boosts, can explain why 
very young children can are not puzzled by the woman’s response to a cut finger.  
A holistic account of the hearer’s emotional responses to narrative, however, 
can build on Tan’s alertness to the role of reader/hearer impotence in narrative 
experience, and of the distinction between reader emotion and character emotion. In 
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10
perception, we act on the environment to deepen our understanding of it, if only 
through eye saccades (Grimes, 1996; Smith and Henderson, 2008; Henderson, 2003). 
In narrative experience, however, we are unmoored from our immediate environment; 
the hearer of a narrative cannot act on the stimulus to derive greater sensual 
information about the scene depicted. Both perception and narrative may engage the 
same machinery of predicting incoming signals, as I discuss below (Clark 2016; 
Gerrans 2014). But the concepts instantiated by language cannot always be 
interrogated in the same sensory depth as those arising from perception and action 
embedded in an environment. Instead, they may be experienced in relationship to one 
another, isolated from a shared environment. Even the eye saccades crucial to film 
comprehension can be highly determined by lighting, camera angle, montage etc, and 
the film is not fully available for ecological interrogation through the viewer’s bodily 
location and action (Cutting et al 2011; Hasson et al 2008; Loschky et al 2015; 
Gibson 1979).  
In the first part of the passage from The Juniper Tree, the hearer encounters 
the concepts of a rich man, a good and beautiful wife, the absence of a child, longing 
for a child and praying for a child. The hearer’s passivity, her inability to act on the 
stimulus, means that none of this information can be further probed. The man and the 
wife may give rise to embodied neural effects in relevant sensory and motor areas, but 
these are not instantiated in relation to the child’s perceiving body. Encountering a 
“rich man” face to face, for example, would instantiate a power relationship with a 
child, with embodied consequences (Fiske et al, 2016). Encountering the concept 
through language, however, potentially neutralises such effects and frees the set of 
concepts to interact in novel ways. The “feature tuning” of mental images in response 
to nouns (such as “man” and “wife”) can vary considerably with verbal context 
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11
(Mitchell & Cusack, 2016, pp. 4 – 7). “Man” and “wife”, dis-embedded from a rich 
scene, might mutually influence each other’s instantiations. “Rich” in conjunction 
with “beautiful” might give prominence to the beautiful belongings that wealth can 
buy, rather than, say, the cruel behaviour that wealth can sometimes enable.  
The interactions of this small set of concepts then (“man”, “wife”, “rich”, 
“beautiful”), when experienced passively (in the sense that the body cannot glean 
additional sensory information), in isolation from an environment, and unmoored 
from a perceiving body, may subtly modify the hearer’s statistical model of the 
world’s hierarchy of proximal and distal causes and effects (Clark, 2016; Kirchhoff 
2018). For example, the conjunction of “good”, “rich”, “loving” and “beautiful” with 
“lack” and “longing” may point to a rightly ordered world that has somehow gone 
wrong; the blessed can also be unblessed. Similarly, the imagery of blood on snow 
can be separated from the embodied experience of the cut, so that the blood and snow  
-  again, pushed together through isolation from a perceiving body in a richer 
environment -  can be instantiated through contrasts of colour, temperature and 
texture. As their other features drop out, the aesthetic effect of this combination may 
dominate the potential for distress in a child’s simulation of cutting herself and 
watching herself bleed, recalling Miall and Kuiken’s distinction between “narrative 
emotions” (relating to characters) and “aesthetic emotions” (Miall & Kuiken, 1994, 
1999). The isolation, and then conjunction, of juniper tree, snow, blood, apple, 
aesthetic thrill, and a sudden transition from longing to joy then become causally 
implicated in the subsequent conception of a child.  
This analysis shows the kind of thing that could happen, rather than what must 
happen, but it is enough to raise a doubt that the existing account of event 
segmentation, leading to SMs, using a fixed set of commonsense dimensions, 
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12
alongside  theories of emotional response to characters, can explain this and similar 
narrative inferences which are needed for the SM. In the next section I explore the 
mechanisms by which this hearer might be immersed in narrative through the 
unfolding of a subtly unfamiliar trajectory; a succession of points in a multi-
dimensional space.  
Stratified versus holistic organisation of narrative information 
 Zwaan and Radvansky predict that there may turn out to be more than five 
narrative dimensions involved in the production of SMs (p.167; see Rapp, 2001 for a 
proposed addition). But there is currently no suggestion that the number extends 
beyond common sense concepts such as “location” or “goal”. If “Bill is very tall” 
turns out to be irrelevant to subsequent situations, it is “relegated” and excluded from 
“subsequent situation models”.  If the reader later finds that “Bill could see over 
everyone’s head”, the information can be retrieved and “stored directly with the token 
in the model” (Zwaan and Radvansky, 1998, pp.11, 17, 19 - 20).  
 Zwaan and Radvansky are not proposing, then, a division of information into 
“modelled” and “discarded”. But their account does imply that incoming information 
can and should be identified as having greater or lesser importance for the model. If 
all the incoming information could immediately be incorporated in the model without 
compromising it, there would be no need to monitor the dimensions. The power of an 
SM is not just, as Zwaan and Radvansky correctly point out (pp.162-163), that it is 
more efficient than storing representations of verbatim text, but that it is more 
efficient than treating all of the information provided by verbatim text as equally 
important. While other levels of narrative memory and representation may operate 
outside an informational hierarchy of this kind, it would seem to be essential for event 
segmentation and the formation of SMs. 
Page 50 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cphp E-mail: pp@mechanism.ucsd.edu
Philosophical Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
 
13
 I suggest, however, that in the case of The Juniper Tree, dividing the textual 
information in this way can only be done by sacrificing, among other things, the 
contribution of emotion to narrative inference and coherence. Look again at the 
quotation above, from, “In front of their house…”. To update her SM as she hears this 
passage, the child hearer must identify information relevant to goals and causes, two 
of Zwaan’s and Radvansky’s dimensions; that the woman sighed, and that her heart 
ached, not because her finger was sore or her apple spoiled, but because the 
experience seemed somehow relevant to her desire to have a child.  
 But the fine detail of the “irrelevant” information, I suggest, is important to 
emotion, and the role of emotion in processing. In combination, these elements 
configure an emotional experience which has no counterpart in the child’s real life 
experiences of apples and knives, an experience which reveals that the woman’s 
longing will be fulfilled because, in mysterious ways, nature wills it so.  
 We can illustrate this point in a different way by reverse engineering a 
segment of Zwaan and Radvanksy’s illustration of the processing behind SMs - “Peter 
took the elevator to the fifth floor. He went to talk to his professor”: 
 
…When reading the first sentence, the reader creates a situation model 
involving a token that represents a male individual named Peter who rides an 
elevator for as yet unknown reasons. We assume that the reader infers that Peter 
is in a building and that the event took place before the moment of utterance of 
the sentence….This [second] sentence is integrated with the first one on several 
dimensions. First, the pronoun is a cue to the comprehender to look 
backward…in the integrated model for an appropriate referent. This referent is 
found in Peter, who is the only available referent and shares the feature “male”. 
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14
Second, a goal is constructed (“went to” suggests intentionality…). Third, the 
absence of a shift in tense or any other explicit temporal marker indicates that 
we are still in the same temporal interval... Fourth, the absence of a spatial 
marker indicates we are still in the same spatial region…. Fifth, a second token 
is created representing the professor. The reader probably also infers that Peter 
is a student. This is the content of the current model at Time t2.  
 
This can be represented schematically:  
 
t1 Create PETER
TOKEN (male) 
t1 Create ELEVATOR IN BUILDING IN PAST
SPATIO-TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK 
t1 Combine PETER
TOKEN (male) in ELEVATOR IN BUILDING IN PASTSPATIO-TEMPORAL FRAMEWORK 
t2 Create PROFESSOR
TOKEN (male) 
t2 Modify PETER
TOKEN (male) with GOALVISIT PROFESSOR and with (student) 
t2 Incorporate t2 elements with t1 elements.  
 
If we use this set of instructions to generate a new text, one possibility of many is this:  
 
“Peter rode in the elevator up, up, up. His professor waited as Peter came nearer and 
nearer.” This text is different from the initial one in many ways, from the professor 
waiting, to the absence of “the fifth floor”. But it is as compatible with the situation 
model above as the original. The reader’s emotion, however, is likely to be different. 
The stylistic emphasis on the changing relative distance between Peter and the 
professor may create an element of anxious anticipation. Emotion arising from verbal 
form may underpin the inference of information, rather than the reverse (compare 
Barrett and Bar, 2009). The verbal form suggests that either Peter or the Professor has 
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15
something to fear from the encounter. Peter’s goal may not be related to their roles of 
student and professor; Peter may not be a student at all if his relationship to the 
professor may be that of, say, victim or aggressor. The repetitions of “up” and 
“nearer” do not provide new information on the SM’s dimensions. Yet their emotional 
impact on the reader is important for identifying precisely the information – such as 
characters’ goals - which an SM is intended to capture. While the SM itself need not 
capture reader emotion, the processing leading up to it must if the information in the 
SM is to be correct (for earlier work pointing in this direction, see McNamara & 
Magliano, 2009 and Graesser, Olde & Klettke 2002).  
  Suppose the repetitions in “up and up” and “nearer and nearer” cause fear, 
telling the reader that either Peter or the professor has a sinister goal. Could this 
simply mean a different “goal” node than the model of the first passage? The spatio-
temporal information still models Peter in an elevator and the professor in a room, just 
as in the first case.  
But if the repetitions of “up” and “nearer” simply switch the goal node from 
“visit professor, probably in relation to studies” to “go to professor’s room, not clear 
why, but this may involve danger either to Peter or the professor”, does this bundle of 
information, a bundle which must be expanded if it is to include all the implications 
of fear, deserve the name of “goal node”? Recall that the strength of SMs is saving the 
hearer or reader from remembering not only all the verbatim text, but all of the 
information conveyed by that text. If the model is to incorporate all the implicit 
information generated by emotion, it will be burdened with even more information 
than that of the verbatim text. If emotion is treated as information encoded in the text, 
then it cannot be incorporated in an SM. Yet, as we have seen, emotion may be 
crucial to help a child make correct inferences about texts like The Juniper Tree. An 
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16
improved account of narrative processing, then, will be holistic in its approach to 
information, and distinguish more clearly between the experiential aspects of 
perceiving something, and those of hearing or reading about it.  
A first step is to rethink the processing behind SMs as structured not by five or 
six common sense dimensions, but by dimensions too many to enumerate, resisting 
commonplace psychological categorisation. A neural network model of processing in 
this high dimensional vector space (explained below) can capture recurring 
experiences in processing a given text, including the effects of verbal patterning, 
emotion and the perception of language as agent guided behaviour. Characterising 
those recurrent, downward projections as predictive can also suggest a convincing 
story about immersion in a flow of inner states, and explain overlaps in 
phenomenology between dreaming and narrative immersion. 
High dimensional vector spaces and verbal narrative 
 Think of a word as a sequence of sounds, where each sound has the potential 
to differentially activate every cell in an array. Each phoneme will come to be 
associated with a different pattern, or vector, of activation. The array activates 
another, higher, array through a set of connecting links or synapses, which in turn 
activates the next, and so on. The varying strengths or weights of these connections 
between layers have been determined by past experience, and form matrices which 
transform the vectors and allow recognition of groups of sounds, then words, phrases, 
clauses, sentences and so on (Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Churchland, 2012; 
Jordan, 1986).  
As well as these upward connections, each array has downward connections to 
the one below. This means that the effect of one input on the system can affect the 
way the next input is received, so that frequently repeated sequences of inputs are 
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17
more easily recognised than others (Churchland, 2012, pp.165-170). At a certain level 
or levels, the points in the vector space initially activated by speech sounds move into 
spaces generated by a much wider range of stimuli associated with those speech 
sounds. On hearing the sounds for the word “apple”, for example, a processing 
journey begins which, depending on the context, may end in an area of vector space 
overlapping, though not identical with, that activated by seeing a real apple (Reddy et 
al, 2010).  
Now let us revisit The Juniper Tree. How does the hearer make the link 
between the interactions of a cluster of concepts (juniper, apple, blood, snow), the 
emotion associated with those interactions, and a character’s conception of a longed 
for child? At first blush, adopting a vector space framework takes us no further 
forward with this problem. The world model of interacting causes built into this 
framework is embedded in the matrices of connection weights, and altering these 
weights is a slow and cumulative process, a matter of weeks or years, not the seconds 
or fractions of seconds involved in responding to a section of a story. How can 
hearing a brief text, or fragment of text, temporarily modify these weights to 
accommodate a different analysis, one in which cut fingers activate representations 
involving beauty and yearning rather than pain and distress, for example? 
One possibility is that instead of modifying the matrices of weights, the 
recurrent, downward connections can modify the stream of inputs. In the case of The 
Juniper Tree, all of the effects of the text to date influence the pattern of downward 
connections in ways that affect the upward impact of new inputs. The succession of 
states and their direction of travel form a trajectory through vector space. In what 
follows, I suggest that verbal narratives can stimulate trajectories of this kind that 
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18
depart from normal perceptual experience, while staying within the bounds of a pre-
existing world model. 
Behavioural, neuro-psychological and neuroimaging evidence suggests that 
“concepts are flexible, distributed representations comprised of modality specific 
conceptual features” (Kiefer and Pulvermüller 2012, 805). This flexibility is 
consistent with accounts by Paul Churchland and Margaret Boden characterising the 
reconceptualization of an input in the “hidden” layers of a neural network as a 
creative process. Each cycle of Newton’s meditations on the moon could modify his 
existing concept a little more, until the moon is less like a wheel running on a track 
and more like a ball thrown by a force (Churchland 2012, pp.187-196; Boden 2004). 
The everyday experience of narrative text may similarly push us through otherwise 
unfamiliar trajectories in vector space. 
Vector spaces and inference  
The extract from The Juniper Tree, typically of fairy tales (Thompson, 1946, 
p.8), provides minimal information about particulars of place or time. The event 
happened “once” and “in winter time” rather than on, say, 4 January 1822. The time, 
then, is indeterminate, as are the unmodified nouns “woman”, “tree”, “apple” and so 
on. Adjectival modification affects the ways in which nouns are processed 
(Westerlund et al, 2015; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2013). Each of the unmodified concrete 
nouns in this case, then, could potentially activate an area of vector space associated 
with a prototypical representation (of women, trees, apples and so on), areas which 
capture averages of similarity and difference across multiple dimensions, thus 
enabling real life recognition of a particular woman, tree or apple by its location 
relative to the average. Coming as they do in a sequence, the downward, recurring 
connections generated by these nouns create a context in which singular entities (the 
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particular woman, tree, apple of the story) are reconceptualised as prototypical ones 
(compare the comments on style and prediction in Kuperberg & Jaeger, 2016, p.48). 
The later nouns “blood” and “snow” arrive in, and reinforce, a landscape of 
prototypes. A real life encounter with objects and people that all coincided precisely 
with the average of their type might create a sense of the uncanny, and “seemingly 
invite a supernatural explanation” (Bouvet and Bonnefon, 2015, p. 956).  
A second contextual effect could arise from repeated syntactic patterns. The 
text consists mainly of additive clauses – “and as she was peeling…and the blood 
fell…and she looked…and her heart ached” – with little of the subordination (“she cut 
her finger causing the blood to fall”, “her heart ached because…”) that can point 
directly to causal relationships (Morera et al, 2017). In perception, a repeated 
temporal sequence can have a strong, sometimes misleading, association with 
causality (Churchland, 2012, pp.177-178). However, the recurrent connections 
generated by a repeated syntactic pattern of additive clauses could undo this because 
the hearer is not free to probe causation as she would in a richer environment.  
By contrast, perception of a scene like this in a real world, rich environment 
would be structured by causal relationships. The appearance of the woman would be 
modulated by effects of light and shadow caused by the tree and the snow (Kersten et 
al 1997). Spatial structure has long been understood as important to perceiving causal 
narrative structure (Heider 1944), just as internal scene construction is critical to both 
episodic memory and verbal narrative (Mullally et al 2012). In this case, in the 
absence of a causal structure relating many of the elements in the scene, and in a 
landscape of syntactically weakened causal links, other patterns of similarity and 
difference can interpret the relationships between inputs. The tastes and textures of 
apples, for example, and the texture and temperature of snow could be located in 
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adjacent or overlapping areas of vector space, as multisensory integration (Stein et al, 
1988) is released from the constraints imposed by real world stimuli. The pain of a cut 
might be measured against the colour and temperature of blood. In a real world scene 
these modality specific overlaps may be unimportant, but here, in a sparser, less 
defined scene, they take on new power. The synaesthetic effects of this process 
would, moreover, have an aesthetic reward (Ward et al, 2008).  
Now let us imagine that the hearer has had many disappointed hopes, but has 
also experienced a powerful hope turning into a belief. The move from hope to belief, 
then, is a possible sequence for her, but not a necessary one. In a context coloured by 
the uncanny and by aesth tic reward, a context in which normal causal relations have 
been muted, this sequence (of hope turning to belief) may become the most likely 
path for upcoming activation (compare Clark, 2016, pp.231 – 237). The hearer can 
hypothesise that the woman sighs because of longing, not physical pain, without 
modifying her world model’s matrix of weights.  
A vector space account of narrative coherence 
 In 1990, the cognitive scientist Jeffrey Elman discussed the problems of 
representing time in parallel, distributed, connectionist models of cognition, similar to 
the neural networks outlined above. Until then, Elman explained, a common approach 
to the parallel processing of sequentially structured inputs, like language, had been to 
treat time as “an additional dimension of the input” by giving it an explicit “spatial 
representation”. The first item in a verbal sequence could be represented in the first 
space in a vector, and so on. Elman argued that this approach runs into intractable 
problems (which I do not discuss here; Elman, 1990). Time is an explicit dimension 
of the input to SMs in existing accounts: a complete SM, ‘stored in long-term memory 
after all the textual input has been processed’ will consist of ‘the situations at Times t1 
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through tx’, allowing comprehenders to ‘ruminate over a story’ later (Zwaan & 
Radvansky 1998, 166). While not described as a spatial representation in the form of 
a numerical matrix, this is an approach which makes time an explicit dimension in 
both processing (one of the five associated with SMs) and output (the SM itself).  
 Instead of treating time as a dimension of the input, Elman suggested instead 
an implicit representation of time in which a layer of “context” cells is added to the 
layers of “hidden” cells. At time t:  
 
Both the input units and context units activate the hidden units; the hidden 
 units then feed forward to activate the output units. The hidden units also feed  
back to activate the context units. (Elman 1990, p.182).  
 
The context units modify future inputs by responding to previous inputs. In this way, 
time can be represented through its cumulative effects “on processing and not as an 
additional dimension of the input”.  
 A “spatial metaphor for time” of the kind identified by Elman as problematic 
is implied by the SM’s linear structure from t1 to tx, which ensures coherence, letting 
the reader ‘know when the described events took place both relative to each other and 
relative to the time at which they were narrated’  (Elman, 1990, p.181; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998, p.181).  But are such representations of time always essential to the 
processing that enables SMs? If I am asked to write a reference, I might try to recall 
specific instances of the candidate’s past behaviour. However, if I predict what my 
friend will order at a restaurant, I need not bring to mind all or any of the past 
episodes underwriting that prediction, even if I could. To test narrative 
comprehension, researchers need to resolve the experience of verbal narrative into 
Page 59 of 74
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cphp E-mail: pp@mechanism.ucsd.edu
Philosophical Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
 
22
actions after the event, such as answering questions about a story accurately, or 
retelling it (Ennemoser 2007, p. 354; Strong 1998). One way to describe this is the 
ability to interrogate the SM which arose from processing the narrative.  
But there is another way to think about, and potentially even measure, verbal 
narrative comprehension: the success of a cognitive system in continually moving 
towards stasis in response to an incoming flow of text (Spivey, 2007, p.36 and 
elsewhere). A child hearer could experience this move to stasis yet still perhaps be 
unable, if asked, to accurately reconstruct a timeline of the story or answer questions 
accurately. Even scrub jays can “remember” sequences of their own actions without, 
presumably, being able to represent those sequences to themselves or to others 
(Clayton and Dickinson 1998, 1999; Suddendorf and Busby, 2003). As Elman points 
out, “The representation of time – and memory – is highly task-dependent”. A 
potentially explicit spatial representation of time may be essential to the task of 
reproducing a story. But it is not necessarily essential to experiencing the flow of 
verbal narrative as coherent.  
The Juniper Tree continues with the woman’s pregnancy, her death from 
happiness on giving birth, and her husband’s remarriage: 
 
By the second wife he had a daughter, but the child of his first wife was a little 
son as red as blood and as white as snow. Now when the woman looked at her 
daughter she loved her so, but looking at the little boy cut her to the heart.  
 
Not long after, the stepmother kills the boy and hides the evidence by cooking the 
body parts in a stew. The text never refers to her as “the stepmother” but as “the 
woman” or, when addressed by the boy himself, “mother”: “Mother,” said the little 
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boy, “how strange and wild you look!”. To avoid confusion with the real mother, and 
experience the story as coherent, the child hearer must remember that the real mother 
died and was replaced by a wicked stepmother. One solution is to tag the mother’s 
death and the stepmother’s arrival as tx and tx+1, ready for incorporation in an SM by 
situating them on a timeline. But the child’s experience of the text as coherent can be 
explained without this explicit representation of time: 
 
And so the mother took the little boy and hacked him in pieces and put the 
pieces in the pot and stewed him in the sour broth. But Ann Marie stood by and 
cried and cried and the tears fell in the pot so that it didn’t need any salt. 
When the father came home he sat down to supper and said, “And where is my 
son?” And so the mother brought a big dish of black stew and Ann Marie cried 
and couldn’t stop crying.  
 
I argued above that the real mother could be generated in areas of vector space which 
involved the uncanny and the aesthetic effects of synaesthesia. The stepmother, on the 
other hand, is developed through “taking” and “hacking”, and the objects surrounding 
her are “the pot” and “the sour broth”, reinforced soon after as “a big dish” and “black 
stew”. The difference in the areas of vector space activated in each case mean that 
neither a timeline of death and remarriage, nor a consistent verbal distinction between 
“mother” and “stepmother”, are needed for the child hearer to experience the text as 
coherent. Indeed, at this point in the story she need not even explicitly remember that 
there ever was a good mother. After all, many stories, including oral epic and 
medieval romance, are experienced as coherent even when found, after performance, 
to be incoherent and flawed by “continuity errors” (Griffith, 2012).  
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A predictive, vector space account of narrative immersion 
 There is growing evidence that language comprehension is predictive at every 
level, from phonemes and words to discourse. Probabilistic processing, for example, 
can pre-activate words in comprehension (Delong et al, 2005). Grammatical 
inflections can be anticipated through semantic integration, and word meanings can 
be predicted on the basis of discourse context (Wicha et al, 2004; Van Berkum et al, 
2005; Otten and Van Berkum, 2008). These findings are drawn from different 
languages, multiple linguistic levels and using varied methodologies (Kamide et al, 
2003a; Kamide et al, 2003b; Knoeferle et al, 2005).  
We can, then, characterise the downward connections discussed above as 
predictions about the incoming verbal signal (Clark, 2016, 285-286). In a PP 
framework, downward hypotheses are met by upward prediction error. Patterns of 
prediction error simultaneously modify the next wave of downward hypotheses and 
allocate precision, or increased weight, to the most reliable sources of error for the 
task at hand. Action is integral to this cycle of hypotheses, prediction error and 
precision allocation, through, for example, eye saccades.  
One outcome of a move to PP, or hypothesising controlled by prediction error 
(Clark, 2016), is a new account of relationships between cognitive states such as 
dreaming, hallucination, delusion and imagination (Gerrans, 2014, p. 1; Kirchhoff, 
2018; Seth, 2014, p.101). In what follows I characterise hearing or reading a narrative 
as a cognitive state in which prediction error is limited to the incoming verbal stream, 
so that the hearer or reader, to successfully predict the incoming signal, must predict 
her own inner states, sequestering her sensorimotor responses from the machinery of 
the world around her. 
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Actions to probe the environment can help the hearer to predict the stream of 
words in The Juniper Tree only to a limited extent. Perhaps the storyteller has a lisp, 
and she must compensate for this when predicting phonemes, or perhaps he uses 
particular gestures in their shared space, and her predictive system might direct 
saccades to his face and body (Lwin, 2010). But greater attention to arm movements 
and sound articulation will not help her predict the states of higher levels in her own 
system, such as the combined effects of synaesthesia and the uncanny identified 
above. For these, her best – indeed her only – source of information is the trajectory 
of inner states arising from the experience of the text itself. It is these higher-level 
inner states which must b  explored and probed through the mechanism of precision 
weighting. The hearer’s own states become her environment as far as predicting the 
text goes. In this light, the potential for immersion is not surprising. 
Seen like this, narrative experience in one respect resembles dreaming. Both 
experiences engage the mind in actively predicting an incoming stream of data, but 
without the body being able to act on its environment to direct that stream. Hobson 
and Friston characterise sleep as a state “in which internal predictions are sequestered 
from sensory constraints” (Hobson and Friston, 2012, p.92).  
 Embodied responses to language suggest that the reader or hearer of narrative 
may similarly find her sensorimotor system engaged while sequestered from any 
stimulus but the verbal stream, and inhibited from acting on any stimulus but the 
verbal stream (for example by re-reading a sentence, or asking a reader to pause). 
Narrative comprehension then, might be characterised as simultaneously active, in the 
sense that the system has considerable work to do on internal states as it seeks to 
optimise prediction and achieve stasis, and passive, in that the body has only very 
limited opportunities to act on its environment in pursuit of that stasis, and must 
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develop new trajectories from existing resources to account for the succession of 
internal states.  
 The analogy between narrative immersion and dreaming should not be 
overdone. Narrative stimuli are artefacts, dreams are not. Readers can re-read, but 
dreamers cannot pause and repeat a section of a stimulus. Narrative can engage and 
require conscious effort at problem solving in way that dreams cannot. And readers 
can stop at will. But shared constraints in the two conditions may explain at least 
some of the dream-like phenomenology of narrative immersion. 
 This account of immersion does not require hearers and readers to feel 
emotions for characters, as some existing theories of transportation do (Gerrig, 1993; 
Green & Brock, 2002). Fairy stories like The Juniper Tree can be immersive, but do 
not necessarily encourage direct emotional responses to characters. Stock characters 
are central, not peripheral, to this and other oral genres (Propp, 2010; Lord, 2000). 
The same could be said of immersive responses to a range of other non-realist (in 
Barthes’ sense of ‘the reality effect’; 1986) fictions, which some readers/hearers find 
immersive, from Homer to Virginia Woolf.  
 The sketch above does not assume immersion always happens, just as existing 
models do not assume that comprehension always happens. Some stories, or some 
readers, might reveal an easy to predict causal structure involving little emotion, so 
that attention wanders. With others, prediction might be too hard to permit flow, at 
least on a first reading (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). But a predictive account can explain 
the possibility of later immersion through practice and re-reading, as readers grow 
more expert at predicting a text, like Joyce’s Ulysses (a tough first read for many, an 
immersive re-read for some), an author or a genre (Kibbe et al, 2017).  
Problems 
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  There are potential problems in at least three areas: the cognitive framework; 
a role for conscious reflection; and empirical testing. 
 I have drawn on Clark’s (2016) account of Bayesian predictive processing 
implemented in a neural network. Clark himself has identified some problems with 
both elements (pp.297-300). Alternative approaches to probabilistic inference have 
been explored in both neural simulations and in studies of the biological brain (Egner 
& Summerfield, 2013). Neural networks may not be the best, or even a possible, 
architecture for a generative, probabilistic approach to cognition (Hinton, 2006; 
Wacongne et al, 2012).  
 Another concern is the role of higher domain areas, such as conscious verbal 
reasoning, in probabilistic, generative predictive processing (pp.299-300). I have 
argued that implicit, rather than explicit, representations of time may be enough to 
support at least some narrative processing. But conscious reflection on narrative 
experience may be needed to retell, interpret and experience stories as meaningful and 
instructive. Reducing the role of reflection may mean missing some of the point of 
narrative in the first place (Mulhall, 2007; Malinowski, 1926).  
 A third issue concerns making and testing predictions. Spivey and others have 
pioneered methods to measure language processing in real time (Spivey, 2007, pp.74-
77). In combination with real time measures of affect, these could test predictions 
about how, for example, affect guides hearers towards inferences in narrative 
processing. Rapid advances in the verbal classification of images by neural networks 
suggest that upending these networks to produce images from text (as readers do) may 
reveal surprising implicit causal frameworks (Mordvintsev, 2015).  
Conclusion 
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28
 Describing narrative experience in a PP, neural network framework reveals 
that the range of benefits we reap from stories may be both more subtle and more 
widely diffused than we realise. Narrative experience may be a highly creative 
process, reconceiving the world as recognisable, yet with a different causal structure 
to that in which we live and move and have our being.  
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